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NOTE
Deciding Where to Draw the Line:
Compactness as a Protection Against
Gerrymandering in Missouri Redistricting
Pearson v. Koster, 367 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. 2012) (en banc)

STEPHANIE BRADSHAW*

I. INTRODUCTION
Every ten years, the release of the U.S. Census triggers a tidal wave of
political ramifications that ripple from coast to coast. The census reflects the
fluctuation in population among the states, necessitating a shuffling of,
among other things, state legislative and congressional districts.1 States are
awarded Congressional representatives based on their populations: the greater
the population, the greater the representation.2 While some states gain representatives and others lose them, the outcome is the same: districts must be
redrawn.3 In what has been likened to a “periodic comet,” challenges by citizens to this redistricting frequently arise.4 Behind this litigation is often the
fear that the authorities entrusted with the task of producing district maps will
abuse their discretion and, in a practice known as “gerrymandering,” draw
districts that dilute the voting strength of particular groups.5 Article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution contains a provision that acts to combat
this practice, requiring that districts be “as compact . . . as may be.”6 Mis* B.J., University of Missouri, 2009; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2014; Senior Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2013-14. I
would like to extend my sincere thanks to Professor Erin Hawley for her advice, insight, and encouragement throughout the writing process.
1. See Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:11-cv-04884, 2011 WL
5025251, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011).
2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: YOUR GUIDE TO CENSUS
2010 REDISTRICTING DATA FROM THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1, 3 (2010), available at
http://www.census.gov/rdo/pdf/StrengthInNumbers2010.pdf [hereinafter STRENGTH
IN NUMBERS].
3. See Pearson v. Koster (Pearson I), 359 S.W.3d 35, 37 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
4. Radogno, 2011 WL 5025251, at *1.
5. See id. at *1-3; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (9th ed. 2009) (gerrymandering is defined as “[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral
districts . . . to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.”).
6. MO. CONST. art. III, § 45.
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souri courts have consistently expressed the necessity of this “compactness
requirement,” stating, “The protection of this constitutional provision applies
to each Missouri voter, in every congressional district. ‘No right is more
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those
who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.’”7 However,
the effect of a century of redistricting litigation, culminating in the recent
Supreme Court of Missouri case Pearson v. Koster, has been to weaken this
provision rather than strengthen it. In order to reinforce state protections
against gerrymandering, Missouri courts must interpret this constitutional
requirement in a way that ultimately holds redistricting authorities responsible for justifying gross deviations from the standard of compactness.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
With the release of the 2010 Census in early 2011 – and as a result of a
slump in population growth compared to that of other states – Missouri
lost one member of its delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives,
reducing the number of Missouri representatives from nine to eight.8
Pursuant to the state constitution, Missouri’s General Assembly (General
Assembly) is vested with the duty to reevaluate, and subsequently redistrict,
the state’s congressional districts.9 Article III, section 45 of the Missouri
Constitution provides:
When the number of representatives to which the state is entitled in
the House of the Congress of the United States under the census . . . is
certified to the governor, the general assembly shall by law divide the
state into districts corresponding with the number of representatives to
which it is entitled, which districts shall be composed of contiguous
10
territory as compact and as nearly equal in population as may be.

Upon holding hearings throughout the state, the General Assembly approved
the new congressional redistricting map (the Map) in April 2011, and it went
into effect as part of House Bill 193.11 After surviving a veto by Governor
Jay Nixon, the Map was officially adopted on May 4, 2011.12
Following its release, two groups of plaintiffs immediately challenged
the Map.13 Both groups sought the same outcome: that the court invalidate
7. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 39 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
441 (1992)).
8. Brief of the Appellant, Pearson v. Koster (Pearson II), 367 S.W.3d 36 (Mo.
2012) (en banc) (No. SC92326), 2012 WL 662844, at *1.
9. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 41-42.
10. MO. CONST. art. III, § 45.
11. Brief of the Appellant, supra note 8, at *2.
12. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 38.
13. Id.
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the Map to prevent the government from conducting elections under its
framework and, ultimately, that the General Assembly draw a new map to
take its place.14 The “Pearson plaintiffs” and the “McClatchey plaintiffs”15
(collectively referred to as Plaintiffs) filed separate petitions contesting the
validity of the Map.16 Both actions were filed in the Circuit Court of Cole
County in Jefferson City.17 Naming Attorney General Chris Koster and Secretary of State Robin Carnahan as defendants, the Pearson plaintiffs alleged
several claims, chief among which was the assertion that the Map failed to
meet the constitutional standard that districts be as compact as may be.18 The
McClatchey plaintiffs, who named Carnahan as the sole defendant, also took
issue with the compactness of the Map’s districts.19 Specifically, Plaintiffs
alleged that districts 3 and 5 were “particularly suspect” due to the meandering nature of their boundary lines.20 Plaintiffs characterized this lack of compactness as an attempt at political gerrymandering by the General Assembly.21 Defendants Koster, Carnahan, and intervening defendants State Representative John J. Diehl and State Senator Scott T. Rupp22 (collectively referred to as Defendants) responded by filing motions to dismiss or, in the

14. Id. Although Plaintiffs did not specifically demand that a new map be
drawn, if they had received their requested relief a new map would have naturally
followed. See Preisler v. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d 427, 437 (Mo. 1955) (en banc) (ordering the redistricting authority, upon a finding that the prior map was unconstitutional,
to create new, valid districts).
15. The Pearson plaintiffs are Kenneth Pearson, Joan Bray, Timothy Brown,
Mildred Conner, Brian Murphy, and Phoebe Ottomeyer. The McClatchey plaintiffs
are Stan McClatchey, Ivan Griffin, Laura Meeks, Patricia Smith, Molly Teichmann,
Donna Turk, and Matt Ullman. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 42 n.1 (Mo. 2012)
(en banc).
16. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 38.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 40. In addition to their compactness claim, the Pearson plaintiffs also
presented additional claims to the trial court. These claims include: that the Map
violated Article I, sections 1 and 2 of the Missouri Constitution in that it “deprives
equal protection of rights” and is not “instituted solely for the good of the whole.” Id.
at 40-42.
19. Id. at 40. Like the Pearson plaintiffs, the McClatchey plaintiffs also presented other claims, including the argument that the Map “reflects bipartisan gerrymandering.” Id.
20. Id.; see also id. at 43 app. A.
21. See Brief of Appellants, Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35 (Mo. 2012) (en banc)
(No. SC92200), 2011 WL 7005504, at *12 (alleging that the General Assembly’s
merger of highly urban areas with highly rural areas to create district 5 was “an act of
political gerrymandering”).
22. Diehl and Rupp intervened in their capacity as chairs of the redistricting
committees for the House and Senate, respectively. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 42
n.2 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
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alternative, for judgment on the pleadings.23 After oral arguments, the court
entered an order dismissing both cases.24 Plaintiffs subsequently appealed to
the Supreme Court of Missouri.25
In Pearson I,26 the supreme court consolidated the two cases, officially
merging the Pearson plaintiffs and the McClatchey plaintiffs into a single
group.27 Reviewing Plaintiffs’ claim regarding the districts’ compactness, the
court stated that the evaluation should be limited to an objective inquiry:
whether, under the evidence presented, the districts actually comply with the
constitutional mandate that they be “as compact . . . as may be.”28 In articulating this objective standard, the court expressly rejected the proposition that
good faith, or lack thereof, by the General Assembly should have any bearing
on the analysis.29 The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the compactness of the Map’s districts.30 However,
the court did not make any factual determinations, instead stating, “It is a
question of fact, yet to be tried” whether the districts meet the standard of
compactness.31 Consequently, the court remanded the case to the trial court
with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this issue.32 On remand, both Plaintiffs and Defendants presented evidence regarding the compactness of the challenged districts.33 Once more, the trial court entered
judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiffs had failed to show
that the districts did not meet the standard of compactness.34 The court emphasized that the requirement does not necessitate absolute precision.35
Plaintiffs again appealed to the supreme court.36
The supreme court took up Plaintiffs’ second appeal in the instant case.
In Pearson II,37 Plaintiffs asserted that “the trial court’s judgments erroneously interpret the constitutional standard for compactness and . . . the judgments

Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 38.
Id.
Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 42.
The court refers to Plaintiffs’ first appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri
as “Pearson I.” This terminology will be used throughout.
27. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 42.
28. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 40.
29. Id. at 39-40.
30. Id. at 40.
31. Id. The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ other claims.
See id. at 40-43. For discussion of these additional claims, see supra notes 18-19.
32. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 43.
33. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 42 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. While the court does not use this terminology in its opinion, for purposes of
clarity the instant case will be referred to as “Pearson II” throughout.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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are against the weight of the evidence.”38 The court focused on the language
of the compactness provision, again setting forth an objective standard and
rejecting the argument that good faith by the legislature is a relevant consideration.39 Affirming the trial court’s judgment, the court found that it “did
not erroneously declare the meaning of ‘as compact . . . as may be’” under the
constitution and that – deferring to the trial court’s findings of fact – Plaintiffs
failed to prove that the Map violated this standard.40 Like the trial court, the
supreme court stressed that the compactness standard is not a provision that
can be met with complete accuracy.41 Instead, the court emphasized that
“mandatory and permissible recognized factors can impact the configuration
of district boundaries,” including natural and historical boundary lines and the
boundaries of political subdivisions.42 The court held that the Map did not
contravene Article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution because the
irregular shapes of the contested districts were the result of such permissible
factors.43 Therefore, the Map was enforceable.44

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
As was the case in Pearson II, issues of redistricting typically arise in
the wake of the release of the U.S. Census. Every ten years, the U.S. Census
Bureau, a subdivision of the U.S. Department of Commerce, conducts a nationwide census.45 Questionnaires delivered to households across the nation
generate a slew of data, measuring the population of cities, counties, and
states.46 These statistics perform various functions, one of which is to ensure
that legislative districts, both on the state and federal levels, reflect their respective population numbers.47 Article I, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution,
establishing the census, states in pertinent part:
Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this union, according to their respective
Numbers . . . . The actual enumeration shall be made within three
Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 41.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47-48, 51.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 41, 50.
Id. at 51.
See id. at 41.
STRENGTH IN NUMBERS, supra note 2, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 3.
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within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they
48
shall by Law direct.

Thus, the release of new census data necessitates the redrawing of district
lines.49 The authority charged with performing this redistricting varies depending on whether districts are being drawn for state or federal legislative
purposes.50 In cases of federal legislative redistricting in Missouri, the General Assembly is vested with the power to divide the state into districts. 51
However, as a result of this power, new maps often give rise to a fear that the
General Assembly will abuse its discretion and draw districts that work to
weaken the vote of particular groups, specifically the minority political party.52 This tactic, known as political gerrymandering, is “[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular
shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.”53
Due to these concerns, legislative power in matters of redistricting is not
absolute; both the federal government and state constitutional provisions
place limits on the discretion of the General Assembly in making its apportionments.54 In analyzing the Supreme Court of Missouri’s holding in Pearson II, it is important to examine not only Missouri’s constitutional provisions
and judicial precedent, but also the standard imposed by the federal courts.
Part A of this section will discuss the federal standard, in particular the “one
person, one vote” principle established by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Wesberry v. Sanders.55 Part B will explore a century of Missouri redistricting

48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
49. See, e.g., Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 1:11-CV-04884, 2011 WL

5025251, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011).
50. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 45 (directing that congressional redistricting be
performed by the General Assembly); MO. CONST. art. III, § 7 (directing that state
legislative redistricting be performed by specially-appointed commissions).
51. MO. CONST. art. III, § 45. It should be noted that state House and Senate
redistricting is not performed by the General Assembly; rather, such redistricting is
effectuated by commissions appointed by the governor. Id. art. III, § 7. However,
these commissions are still bound by a requirement that districts be “as compact . . .
as may be.” Id. art. III, § 5. Missouri courts have interpreted all of the state constitution’s compactness provisions in the same manner. See infra Part III.B.1-2.
52. See Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Application of the Constitutional “Compactness Requirement” to Redistricting, in 114 A.L.R. 5TH 311, 323-24 (West 2003).
53. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (9th ed. 2009). The type of gerrymandering
that is referenced here, and will be referenced throughout, is political gerrymandering.
Racial gerrymandering, or the dilution of minority voting strength, is not the focus of
this Note.
54. See Kemper, supra note 52, at 323.
55. See infra Part III.A.
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precedent, examining both the evolution of the compactness requirement and
the expanding scope of legislative discretion.56

A. “One Person, One Vote”
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to impose restrictions on legislative redistricting power.57 In 1964, the Court handed
down two landmark decisions, establishing that both federal congressional
districts and state legislative districts must be apportioned on the basis of
population.58 This standard is founded on the principle of “one person, one
vote,” advanced by the Court in its decision in Wesberry v. Sanders.59 In
Wesberry, which arose as a result of inequality of population among Georgia’s congressional districts, the Court stated that the aim of Article I, section
2 of the Constitution was to “mak[e] equal representation for equal numbers
of people the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives.”60 In particular, the Court declared that the Constitution’s directive that “[t]he House
of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen . . . by the People
of the several States” means that “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”61
Less than four months later, the Court in Reynolds v. Sims confirmed
that this standard of population equality extended to state legislative districts
as well.62 In response to a dispute regarding the apportionment of Alabama’s
legislature, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment demanded that state legislative seats be assigned on the basis of
population.63 The Court also declared that this apportionment must be made
in good faith.64 The Court stated:
By holding that as a federal constitutional requisite both houses of a
state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis, we mean
that the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest
and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legisla65
ture, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.

56. See infra Part III.B.
57. See Kemper, supra note 52, at 323.
58. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.

533, 569 (1964).
59. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8, 18.
60. Id. at 2-3, 18.
61. Id. at 4, 7-8; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
62. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
63. Id. at 536-37, 568.
64. Id. at 577.
65. Id.
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Thus, the Court in Reynolds emphasized that not only must districts be
apportioned to achieve population equality, but that the subjective intent of
the authority charged with redistricting is relevant.66 This good faith standard
plays an important role in the adjudication of redistricting challenges, as federal courts utilize a burden-shifting framework to ensure that districts are not
drawn arbitrarily.67 If a plaintiff asserting unconstitutional population disparities among districts shows that the legislature did not make a good faith
effort to achieve equality, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that
there was a reasonable basis for the variance.68 Some states also incorporate
a good faith standard in cases of redistricting.69 Although not mandated by
any state constitutional provision, courts in Iowa, New Jersey, and Maryland
have, upon a showing of “noncompactness,” required the state legislature to
justify deviations from compactness.70 Missouri courts have declined to employ such a framework.71
As a result of this “one person, one vote” principle, redistricting
authorities are required to consider population equality when drawing new
districts.72 In addition, under Reynolds, deviations from this standard must
be made in good faith.73 This requirement ultimately acts to curb the power
of these authorities in their redistricting efforts. Yet, other than the standard
of population equality, federal courts provide little protection against the
unreasonable exercise of legislative discretion.74 In 2004, a plurality of
the U.S. Supreme Court held that claims of political gerrymandering were
nonjusticiable because such claims lack “judicially discernible and

66. See id.
67. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 46 (citing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,

730-31 (1983)).
68. Id.
69. See In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784, 789-90
(Iowa 1972); Jackman v. Bodine, 262 A.2d 389, 395 (N.J. 1970); In re Legislative
Districting of the State, 805 A.2d 292, 306, 324 (Md. 2002).
70. In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d at 791; Jackman,
262 A.2d at 395; In re Legislative Districting of the State, 805 A.2d at 305.
71. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 46.
72. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 568 (1964). In addition, the Voting Rights Act imposes a federal statutory limitation on legislative redistricting, prohibiting the drawing of districts that dilute minority voting strength. Kemper, supra note 52, at 323. The Act states that a violation
is established if “it is shown that the political processes . . . are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens [on account of race or color] in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” Voting Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1763(b) (2006).
73. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577.
74. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399
(2006) (plurality opinion); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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manageable standards” for adjudication.75 This decision, which was subsequently upheld, has thus left the federal courts with little power to provide
redress in cases of gerrymandering.76 Consequently, federal limitations
on legislative discretion are fairly minimal. However, a number of states –
including Missouri – have imposed further constitutional restrictions on
redistricting power.77

B. The Missouri Compactness Requirement
While Missouri’s congressional redistricting provision emphasizes
equality of population, it also instructs the General Assembly to consider an
additional criterion: compactness.78 Article III, section 45 of the Missouri
Constitution articulates the compactness requirement, stating that districts
must be “composed of contiguous territory as compact . . . as may be.”79
Like the standard of population equality required under the U.S. Constitution,
the standard of compactness helps to ensure that districts are not drawn arbitrarily and, therefore, that each person’s vote carries equal weight.80 Missouri
courts have communicated the importance of this standard, stating, “The protection of this constitutional provision applies to each Missouri voter, in every
congressional district. ‘No right is more precious in a free country than that
of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as
good citizens, we must live.’”81
A standard of compactness was first inserted into the Missouri Constitution as an effort to prevent the partisan drawing of district boundaries.82 As
the Supreme Court of Missouri stated, the purpose of the compactness requirement was “to guard, as far as practicable, under the system of representation adopted, against a legislative evil, commonly known as the ‘gerrymander,’ and to require the Legislature to form districts, not only of contiguous,
but of compact or closely united, territory.”83 And despite the fact that this
standard appeared for the first time in Missouri’s Constitution of 1875 and
has subsequently been subject to several amendments, the language has re-

75. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281.
76. See id.; League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 413-14 (holding

claims of political gerrymandering nonjusticiable, stating that a dispute still existed
over which substantive standard to apply).
77. Kemper, supra note 52, at 323.
78. MO. CONST. art. III, § 45.
79. Id.
80. See Kemper, supra note 52, at 323-24.
81. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992)).
82. See State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146 S.W. 40, 61 (Mo. 1912).
83. Id. (quoting People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 40 N.E. 307, 315
(Ill. 1895)).
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mained markedly similar over time.84 This continuity highlights the importance of the provision in guarding against gerrymandering, implying, as
the Supreme Court of Missouri has held, that it is “necessary to the preservation of true representative government.”85
For more than a century, Missouri courts have grappled with their interpretation of the “as compact . . . as may be” standard.86 Among states that
require districts to be as compact as possible, two distinct definitions of
“compactness” have emerged: compactness of physical shape or size and
compactness as “closely united territory.”87 Missouri courts have adopted the
latter definition.88 While the definition of “compact” is well settled, court
interpretation of the provision has demonstrated that the “closely united territory” standard is not the end of the analysis.89 Even if a plaintiff proves that a
map does not meet this standard, the map may yet be valid as a reasonable
exercise of the legislature’s power to draw district boundaries.90 State ex. rel
Barrett v. Hitchcock and its descendants make clear that departures from the
notion of compactness, as long as they can be reasonably justified, are squarely within the discretion of the legislature.91

1. State ex. rel Barrett v. Hitchcock
In State ex. rel Barrett v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court of Missouri first
gave meaning to the term “compact” as it pertains to Missouri’s constitutional
redistricting clause.92 At issue in Barrett were the now-defunct redistricting
provisions, which stated in pertinent part:
Sec. 5. . . . For the election of Senators the State shall be divided into
convenient districts, as nearly equal in population as may be[.]
....
84. Preisler v. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d 427, 435 (Mo.1955) (en banc); see MO.
CONST. art. III, § 45; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, § 9.
85. Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
86. The first Missouri case to analyze the meaning of the redistricting “compactness” standard, State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, was decided in 1912. 146 S.W. at
61-62. Barrett addressed the reapportionment of the state’s senatorial districts. Id.
at 48.
87. Kemper, supra note 52, at 324.
88. See Barrett, 146 S.W. at 61.
89. See Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d at 424-25; Priesler v. Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 552,
554-55 (Mo. 1962) (en banc); Doherty, 365 S.W.2d at 433-34; Barrett, 146 S.W.
at 61.
90. See Barrett, 146 S.W. at 62.
91. See Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d at 425; Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d at 555; Doherty,
284 S.W.2d at 433-35; Barrett, 146 S.W. at 62-65.
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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Sec. 9. . . . When any Senatorial district shall be composed of two or
more counties, they shall be contiguous; such districts to be as compact as may be, and in the formation of the same no county shall be
93
divided.

The plaintiff, Barrett, took issue with senatorial redistricting that had
been performed by a committee comprised of the governor, secretary of state,
and attorney general.94 Barrett filed suit against the judges of the Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis, alleging that the new map had produced “great
inequalities” in population between several St. Louis districts and seeking a
writ of mandamus requiring the judges to divide the city into senatorial districts “of compact and contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as
may be, as is provided by law.”95 The court held the redistricting plan unconstitutional and in doing so evaluated the meaning of “compact” under the
state constitution.96
According to the court in Barrett, two duties had been delegated to the
legislature: making each district “as nearly equal in population . . . as may be”
and making each district “as compact as it can reasonably be made.”97 The
language of these provisions made it clear that the legislature was able to
exercise limited discretion when executing these duties.98 In defining “compact,” the court stated that it “means ‘closely united,’ and that the provision
that districts shall be formed of contiguous and compact territory means that
the counties . . . when combined to form a district, must not only touch each
other, but must be closely united territory.”99 Although the court did not otherwise describe what makes territory “closely united,” in analyzing the shape
of the districts it indicated that physical boundaries were an important consideration in determining compactness.100 Applying these principles to the relevant facts, the court determined that “the Legislature, in apportioning the state

93. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, §§ 5, 9 (emphasis added).
94. Barrett, 146 S.W. at 41-43. Under the Missouri Constitution, it was the duty

of the state legislature to reapportion the state’s senatorial districts. MO. CONST. of
1875, art. IV, § 7. However, the General Assembly adjourned before performing this
duty. Barrett, 146 S.W. at 41. In this situation, the constitution delegated the burden
of redistricting to the governor, secretary of state, and attorney general. MO. CONST.
of 1875, art. IV, § 7. As the court emphasized that this delegation “constitute[d] a
legislative body” under these facts, hereinafter they will be referred to as “the legislature.” Barrett, 146 S.W. at 48.
95. Barrett, 146 S.W. at 42-43. This duty was imposed upon the court by section
6 of Article IV of the state constitution. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, § 6.
96. See Barrett, 146 S.W. at 61-65.
97. Id. at 53; see MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, §§ 5, 9.
98. Barrett, 146 S.W. at 53.
99. Id. at 61 (emphasis added) (quoting People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson,
40 N.E. 307, 315 (Ill. 1895)).
100. Id. at 56.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

11

Created on: 2/18/2014 11:31:00 AM
Missouri Law Review,
Vol. 78, Iss. 3 [2013], Art.Last6 Printed: 2/18/2014 11:31:00 AM

File: Bradshaw – Final Formatting – 1/23/14

880

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

into districts, wholly disregarded the constitutional mandates as to compactness of territory and equality in population.”101
In reaching this conclusion, the court made it clear that while the Missouri Constitution gives some discretion to the General Assembly in matters
of redistricting, that discretion is not absolute.102 While the redistricting authority may deviate from the standards enunciated in the constitution, the
reasons for such a departure must be reasonably justifiable.103 The court stated, “Any departure from the limitation of equality in population must be
made for the sake of securing greater compactness, and any departure from
the limitation of compactness must be made for the purpose of securing
greater equality in population.”104 However, after examining the populations
of the districts in conjunction with their shapes, the court found that the largest discrepancies in population were between the districts that were the least
compact.105 The court emphasized that, as the implementation of the objective standard of compactness was necessarily subject to the discretion of
those charged with redistricting, it was important to regulate legislative
whims.106 The court explained:
[I]t was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution to confer
upon the Legislature the unlimited power and discretion to form the
districts in such shapes and dimensions as it might, in its own opinion,
107
deem proper, nor to give to each a population which it deemed best.

2. The Preisler Cases
Following Barrett, the courts were largely silent until a flurry of litigation erupted following the decennial censuses of 1950, 1960, and 1970. The
cases arising from these proceedings – Preisler v. Doherty, Preisler v.
Hearnes, and Preisler v. Kirkpatrick – served to further delineate the scope of
legislative discretion permitted in Missouri redistricting and the factors that
bear on compactness.108 As a result of the constitutionally-mandated power
Id.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 54.
Id.
See generally Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. 1975) (en banc),
overruled by Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. 2012); Preisler v. Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d
552 (Mo. 1962) (en banc); Preisler v. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d 427, 435 (Mo. 1955) (en
banc). These three cases were initiated by Paul W. Preisler, a St. Louis lawyer, activist, and politician. Preisler, Paul W., OUR CAMPAIGNS, http://www.ourcampaigns.
com/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=158585 (last modified Aug. 27, 2011).
Preisler filed Doherty, his first redistricting suit, while he was a student at the St.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
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bestowed upon the General Assembly and other redistricting authorities,109
the Supreme Court of Missouri has consistently given these authorities a wide
berth in drawing district maps.110 In particular, the court has delineated factors and circumstances that permit the legislature to depart from the standard
of compactness proffered by Barrett.
At issue in Preisler v. Doherty was the 1952 redistricting of the City of
St. Louis.111 The Board of Election Commissioners of the City of St. Louis
(the Board) had divided the city into seven state senatorial districts.112 Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the districts’ validity.113 Instead of the state legislature drawing the new districts, it was the
Board that was charged with the duty.114 However, it was still confined to the
same standard as the General Assembly: that the districts be as compact as
may be.115 The Supreme Court of Missouri found that none of the districts
were physically compact, describing one as “T-shaped” and another as “Lshaped.”116 Speaking to the power of the redistricting authority to depart
from the standard of compactness, the court stated:
[C]ourts may not interfere with the wide discretion which the Legislature has in making apportionments for establishing such districts when
legislative discretion has been exercised. It is only when constitutional limitations placed upon the discretion of the Legislature have been
wholly ignored and completely disregarded in creating districts that
117
courts will declare them to be void.

The court listed factors that might justify a departure from compactness, including the observation of political subdivisions, attempts to obtain population equality, and natural boundary lines.118 However, the court found that, in
creating the districts at issue in Doherty, none of these factors were relied

Louis University School of Law. Id. He died in 1971, while Kirkpatrick was still
being litigated. Id.
109. While the General Assembly is charged with congressional redistricting,
different authorities conduct state legislative redistricting. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
110. See generally Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422; Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 552;
Doherty, 284 S.W.2d at 431.
111. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d at 430.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. In situations where a county was allotted more than one senator, former
Article III, section 8 of the Missouri Constitution delegated districting of the county
to local authorities. MO. CONST. art. III, § 8 (repealed 1966).
115. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d at 432.
116. Id. at 432-33, 437.
117. Id. at 431.
118. Id. at 432, 434.
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upon.119 “[D]epartures from compactness were not made to obtain equality of
population, [and] the departures from ward lines in making districts were not
used to obtain compactness,” the court wrote, but instead “aided in making
them less compact, more irregular, longer and narrower.”120 The Board’s
departure from compactness in drawing the districts was not justified by any
acceptable factor, and as a result the court found that the Board abused its
discretion and the districts were rendered invalid.121
The next Missouri case to take up the issue, Preisler v. Hearnes, arose
as a result of congressional redistricting.122 The plaintiff claimed that the
1961 Act dividing the state into new congressional districts resulted in a lack
of compactness, rendering the Act unconstitutional.123 Among his complaints, the plaintiff suggested that greater compactness could be achieved by
dividing counties.124 The court emphatically dismissed this argument, and in
doing so stressed the importance of keeping counties united.125 “[C]ounties
are important governmental units, in which the people are accustomed to
working together. Therefore, it has always been the policy of this state, in
creating districts of more than one county (congressional, judicial or senatorial) to have them composed of entire counties.”126 In short, the Hearnes court
placed great emphasis on the preservation of political subdivisions – in this
case, counties – in redistricting efforts.127
Despite the holding that county boundaries were important to the compactness inquiry, the court in Hearnes again affirmed that the General Assembly had wide latitude in adhering to the rule.128 It declared that “urban
conditions” could justify dividing counties, noting that this was the case in
the 1961 Act with respect to counties in both Kansas City and St. Louis, the
state’s two largest cities.129 And while the court took the same stance that it
did in Doherty regarding legislative discretion – stating that the General Assembly has a large berth in apportioning the districts – it used even stronger
language in doing so.130 The court acknowledged that the tenth district was
not in fact reasonably compact and that it could have been made more compact by adding two additional counties.131 Yet, it still found the 1961 Act
Id. at 434.
Id.
Id. at 435.
Preisler v. Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Mo. 1962) (en banc).
Id. Plaintiff also made an argument regarding the disparity in population
among the districts. Id.
124. Id. at 556.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 557.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 555.
131. Id. at 557.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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constitutional.132 In explaining this counterintuitive result, the court underscored the importance of legislative discretion.133 It stated:
Very likely each legislator individually would draw somewhat different district lines. Therefore, any redistricting agreed upon must always
be a compromise. Mathematical exactness is not required or in fact obtainable and a compromise, for which there is any reasonable basis, is
134
an exercise of legislative discretion that the courts must respect.

The court in Hearnes thus went beyond the Doherty court, suggesting that
even if a district is unequivocally noncompact (as was true of the tenth district), as long as a reasonable basis for the deviation existed – in Hearnes,
greater equality of population – the fact that a district is not as compact as
possible will not render a map unconstitutional.135
The most recent case136 interpreting Missouri’s compactness provision
resulted from state senatorial redistricting conducted in the wake of the 1970
decennial census.137 In Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, the sole question presented on
appeal was whether the districts were as compact as may be.138 As in
Hearnes, the Supreme Court of Missouri conceded that at least one district
did not completely meet the compactness requirement.139 In addition, the
court agreed that the changes to the districts proposed by the plaintiffs would
in fact make some districts more compact.140 Nevertheless, the court did not
find the districts unconstitutional.141
In upholding the district map, the Kirkpatrick court drew upon the holding in Hearnes and once again emphasized legislative discretion.142 The
court reiterated that the redistricting authority is inevitably made up of
“fallible human beings” and that no districts are perfectly compact or without
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
While Preisler v. Kirkpatrick is the most recent Missouri case bearing on
the court’s decision in Pearson II, there has been other recent litigation arising from
the state’s redistricting. On May 25, 2012 – the same day the Pearson II opinion
was published – the court also handed down its decision in Johnson v. State. 366
S.W.3d 11 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). Like Pearson II, Johnson also stemmed from congressional redistricting. Id. at 16. However, as the court in Pearson II does not consider the Johnson holding in rendering its decision, Johnson will not be further analyzed in this Note.
137. Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Mo. 1975) (en banc), overruled by Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
138. Id. at 424 (quoting MO. CONST. art. III, § 5).
139. Id. at 426.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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room for improvement.143 Except in rare occasions where districts take
on naturally compact shapes, such as circles or squares, meandering county
lines and uneven population density do not lend themselves to perfect,
“geometric” compactness.144
The court also expanded upon the scope of this discretion, clarifying
how its abuses would be measured.145 In highlighting its finding that the
redistricting commission made “an honest and good faith effort” in constructing the districts, the court appeared to suggest that there was a subjective
element in assessing whether legislative discretion was violated.146 The court
also held that because the districts substantially complied with the compactness requirement, they were constitutionally sound.147 Therefore, not only
did the court in Kirkpatrick imply that the General Assembly must act in
good faith in adhering to the compactness requirement, it also suggested that
this standard must only be substantially met in order to pass constitutional
muster.148 However, this language was largely dismissed by Pearson II,
which chose to interpret the compactness requirement in a way that negated
legislative good faith as a consideration.149 Instead, the court in Pearson II
intimated that legislative discretion permitted the creation of noncompact
districts, as long as such lack of compactness could be justified by “mandatory and permissible” factors.150

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, Plaintiffs ultimately asserted that the trial court failed
in finding the Map valid under the standard of compactness articulated in
Article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution.151 In particular, Plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of districts 3, 5, and 6.152 Before examining
the characteristics of these contested districts, the court first addressed Plaintiffs’ other claims: that the trial court’s failure to shift the burden to Defendants to justify the Map’s departures from compactness was an error153 and
that it incorrectly interpreted the language “as compact . . . as may be.”154

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 427.
Id. at 426-427.
See Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 45-46 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
See id. at 41.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 45. This claim was only raised by one set of plaintiffs: the McClatchey
plaintiffs. Id.
154. Id. at 42-43.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
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Plaintiffs asserted that, under Missouri law, after a plaintiff makes a
showing that a district could be more compact the burden shifts to the state
to prove “why the district is not substantially more compact.”155 The court
dismissed this reasoning, affirming that the burden never shifts from the
plaintiff and emphasizing that Plaintiffs erroneously based their argument on
the federal standard, which incorporates a good faith burden-shifting framework.156 The court stated, “It is Plaintiffs who seek a declaration that the
Map is unconstitutional, and shifting the burden of proof conflicts with their
ultimate burden to show that the Map ‘clearly and undoubtedly’ contravenes
the constitution.”157
Having resolved Plaintiffs’ claim regarding the burden of proof, the
court took up its examination of the compactness requirement. The court
observed that the issue raised by Plaintiffs – whether the districts are as compact as may be – is a mixed question of law and fact.158 While the meaning
of the constitutional language at issue is a legal determination, whether the
Map adheres to that standard is a question of fact.159 As such, it was necessary that the court use two different standards of review and analyze the
issues separately.160
Turning first to the meaning of compactness, the court noted that it
would be reviewed de novo.161 The language of Article III, section 45 states
in pertinent part:
When the number of representatives to which the state is entitled in
the House of the Congress of the United States under the census . . . is
certified to the governor, the general assembly shall by law divide the
state into districts corresponding with the number of representatives to
which it is entitled, which districts shall be composed of contiguous
162
territory as compact and as nearly equal in population as may be.

The court recognized that the standard “as compact . . . as may be,” as contained within this provision, is comprised of two distinct parts: “compact” and
“as may be.”163 Examining the word “compact,” the court invoked the interpretation supplied in Barrett, declaring it to mean “closely united territo155. Id. at 45.
156. Id. at 46. See supra Part III.A.
157. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 46 (quoting Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 33

(Mo. 2012) (en banc)).
158. Id. at 47.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 48; see also City of Arnold v. Tourkakis, 249 S.W.3d 202, 204 (Mo.
2008) (en banc) (“[T]his Court reviews a trial court’s interpretation of the Missouri
constitution de novo.”).
162. MO. CONST. art. III, § 45.
163. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 48.
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ry.”164 Other than to say that this definition “does not refer solely to physical
shape or size” and that “a visual observation . . . is not a decisive factor,” the
court did not provide many clues as to the definition.165 Instead, the court
suggested that the phrase “as may be” gives meaning to “compact,” stating
that “[a] determination of whether a district fails to satisfy the requirement
cannot be accomplished solely by inquiring if it is ‘compact,’ because the
modifier ‘as may be’ alters the meaning of that word.”166 According to the
court, “as may be” has a dual effect.167 It conveys that “compactness” is not a
standard that can be met with complete precision, and it grants the legislature
the power to consider other recognized factors, such as those set out in
Doherty, Hearnes, and Kirkpatrick.168 The court stated, “This Court’s precedent does not hold that constitutional requirements can be disregarded to consider other factors but instead recognizes that the constitutional requirements
themselves incorporate such considerations by use of the standard ‘as may
be.’”169 Such factors implicitly authorized for legislative consideration include “population density; natural boundary lines; the boundaries of political
subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, and precincts; and the historical boundary lines of prior redistricting maps.”170
Furthermore, the court recognized other factors that can affect the
compactness of districts, such as “the interrelationship in standards for
population equality and compactness requirements . . . the contiguity requirement . . . [and] federal laws.”171 According to the court, consideration of
these factors means that, even if a district does not appear to be composed
of closely united territory, it could still satisfy the constitutional compactness
requirement.172 Having thus declared the meaning of Missouri’s compactness
provision, the court proceeded to the question of fact: whether districts 3, 5,
and 6 satisfied this standard. In making this determination, the court reviewed the trial court’s findings of fact regarding the characteristics of the
Map and the methodology behind its creation, deferring to its assessment of
the contested evidence.173

Id.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
Id. See supra Part III.B.2.
Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 51.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 44, 52; see also White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 308 (Mo.
2010) (en banc) (“When evidence is contested by disputing a fact in any manner, this
Court defers to the trial court’s determination of credibility.”).
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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A. District 3
Applying the reasoning articulated above, the court examined the features of district 3, focusing on its shape.174 Districts 1 and 2, which lie to the
east of most areas of district 3, were drawn in circular forms; as a result, district 3 took on what the court described as a “crescent shape.”175 Plaintiffs
took issue with district 3’s boundary lines, which they considered to be highly
suspect due to the meandering nature of the boundaries.176 However, according to evidence presented at trial, the shape of districts 1 and 2 could be attributed to an attempt to “protect[] against minority ‘vote dilution’” and thus
comply with the Voting Rights Act.177 Therefore, the court recognized that
while district 3 did have an unusual shape, its deviations from compactness
were the result of a recognized factor: adherence to the Voting Rights Act.178
The court found that the trial court did not err in holding that Plaintiffs failed
to meet their burden, as they were unable to prove that district 3 did not meet
the compactness standard.179

B. Districts 5 and 6
The court’s analysis of district 5 required a more in-depth examination
of the facts than did its analysis of district 3. While it conceded that the factual record showed a dispute regarding whether the deviations in district 5’s
boundaries were “minimal and practical,” the court ultimately determined that
the trial court was correct in holding that Plaintiffs failed to show that district
5 did not meet the compactness requirement.180 The court first examined the
shape of district 5, stating that, while it was not necessarily physically compact, it met the standard advanced in Barrett in that it was closely united territory.181 In regards to legislative discretion, both Plaintiffs’ expert and Defendants’ expert admitted at trial that there was “no bright line between a
compact and non-compact district.”182 Echoing the court’s statement in
Hearnes that mathematical precision cannot be achieved, Defendants present174. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 54.
175. Id.
176. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); see also id. at 43

app. A.
177. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 54; see Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(2006). See supra note 72 for further discussion of the Voting Rights Act.
178. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 53-54. Missouri courts have held that the Voting
Rights Act is a recognized factor justifying deviations from compactness. See Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 27 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (“A valid map must comply
with the Voting Rights Act.”).
179. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 54.
180. Id. at 56.
181. Id. at 55.
182. Id. at 55-56.
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ed testimony that statistical measures, while useful, could not conclusively
establish a map’s compactness.183 The court proceeded to evaluate the evidence presented to the trial court regarding the General Assembly’s use of
recognized factors in deviating from compactness.184 The court reviewed
evidence of both historical boundary lines and the boundaries of political
subdivisions.185 It noted that a portion of Jackson County had historically
been carved out of district 5, and that the Map only slightly expanded that
section.186 Concerning the political subdivisions, the court stated that while
some were divided, others were maintained.187 It further suggested that the
General Assembly could have had a reasonable basis for drawing the boundaries the way it did, in that a greater portion of Kansas City was kept intact, a
factor that the court deemed “legitimate.”188 Ultimately, the court deferred to
the trial court’s evaluation of these facts, holding that its judgment was not
against the weight of the evidence.189 The court made a similar finding regarding district 6, stating that “because the boundary in district 5 has a direct
correlation to the boundary in district 6, the same analysis applies.”190

C. The Holding
Finding no error in the trial court’s conclusions regarding the compactness of districts 3, 5, and 6, the court affirmed the judgments.191 The court
held the Map valid under the standard set forth in Article III, section 45 of the
Missouri Constitution, stating that “the standard does not require absolute
precision in compactness and because mandatory and permissible recognized
factors can impact the configuration of district boundaries . . . plaintiffs do
not prevail on their claim that the trial court’s judgment is against the weight
of the evidence.”192

D. The Dissent
In his dissent, Judge William Ray Price, Jr. disputed the majority’s
claim that the Map met the standard articulated in Article III, section 45.193
In disputing the compactness of the challenged districts, Judge Price took

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 55; see Preisler v. Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Mo. 1962) (en banc).
Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 56.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 84.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss3/6

20

File: 10.Bradshaw.F

2013]

Created on: 2/18/2014 11:31:00 AM
Last Printed: 2/18/2014 11:31:00 AM
Bradshaw: Bradshaw:
Deciding Where to Draw the
Line

COMPACTNESS AND GERRYMANDERING

889

particular issue with the shapes of districts 5 and 6.194 Describing the districts
as “bizarrely shaped,” he asserted that their “visually jarring” borders divided
communities; specifically, the cities of Blue Springs, Independence, Lee’s
Summit, and Oak Grove, each of which was placed in two different districts
as a result of the Map.195 While Judge Price recognized that the General Assembly is allowed discretion in redistricting, he emphasized that Article III,
section 45 was enacted to place limits on that discretion.196 He stated, “Discretionary factors cannot be read into the constitutional fabric if doing so
would functionally erase the requirement that districts be compact.”197 Finally, Judge Price emphasized the importance of preserving the integrity of the
voting process through redistricting.198 Maintaining that the majority’s decision undermined this objective, he stated:
Abstract discussion of law cannot mask the obvious fact that the legislature has attempted to gerrymander a teardrop-shaped portion of
Jackson County from district 5 and place it in district 6. Article III,
section 45 is simply and clearly written. It should be enforced, not fi199
nessed in deference to an obvious legislative shenanigan.

Ultimately, Judge Price advocated that the judgment of the trial court
be reversed.200

V. COMMENT
Pearson II continues down the path of prior precedent, interpreting Article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution in a way that provides little
check against obvious attempts at political gerrymandering. The court echoed Missouri precedent in declaring “compact” to mean “closely united territory” and in listing the factors that may justify a deviation from this standard,
including political and historical boundary lines, urban conditions, and population equality.201 Pearson II also continues a concerning trend in finding
that a district that is decidedly noncompact is nonetheless “as compact . . . as
may be” under the Missouri standard.
While there are situations in which factors may give grounds for a district’s departure from the notion of compactness, through its decision in Pearson II the Supreme Court of Missouri has lowered the level of compliance
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 74 (citing Buechner v. Bond, 650 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo. 1983)
(en banc)).
198. Id. at 84.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 48-50.
194.
195.
196.
197.
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needed to meet this standard to a degree that undermines the ultimate purpose
for which the compactness provision was put into place: to prevent gerrymandering.202 Maintaining close adherence to the standard of compactness is
especially important because federal protections against political gerrymandering are nearly nonexistent.203 As a last line of defense against such political vote dilution, Missouri’s judiciary should interpret the provision in a way
that strengthens, rather than weakens, the standard of compactness.
Part A of this section will examine the importance of Missouri’s compactness requirement in preventing political gerrymandering, while Part B
will take the position that Pearson II has weakened this requirement such that
it no longer fulfills the purposes for which it was adopted.204 Finally, Part C
will argue that, in situations in which districts fail to satisfy the standard of
compactness, courts must impose a good faith standard on the General Assembly to ensure greater protection against attempts at gerrymandering.205

A. The Importance of Compactness in Preventing Gerrymandering
The U.S. Constitution imposes limited restrictions on state redistricting
efforts.206 In doing so, it advances a “one person, one vote” principle that
seeks to prevent vote dilution and ensure that every person’s vote is as nearly
equal in value as possible.207 In determining whether a redistricting map violates this standard, courts use equality of population among the districts as
their measuring stick.208 In cases in which a court finds that a redistricting
body has not made a good faith effort to achieve population equality, maps
are rendered invalid.209 However, federal courts provide little redress beyond
this point.210 In 2004, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear
the Pennsylvania redistricting case Vieth v. Jubelirer, holding that claims of
political gerrymandering were nonjusticiable.211 The Court based its decision
202. See Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
203. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (plu-

rality opinion); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion); Radogno
v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:11-cv-04884, 2011 WL 5025251 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
21, 2011).
204. See infra Parts V.A, V.B.
205. See infra Part V.C.
206. Kemper, supra note 52, at 323. The Voting Rights Act also imposes federal
statutory restrictions on state redistricting. Id. For further discussion of the Voting
Rights Act, see supra note 72.
207. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
208. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S 533, 568 (1964).
209. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969).
210. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399
(2006) (plurality opinion); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
211. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281. The Court also distinguished claims of political gerrymandering from those of racial gerrymandering. Id. at 285-86. It noted that claims
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on a lack of “judicially discernable and manageable standards” for adjudicating this type of claim.212 The Court reaffirmed this position two years later in
another plurality decision, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry
(LULAC), explaining that there was still a dispute over which substantive
standard to apply.213 The upshot of the decisions rendering these cases
nonjusticiable is that questionable redistricting plans may be able to survive
federal claims of political gerrymandering.214
The potential ramifications of these decisions on Missouri courts can be
seen in Pearson I.215 In addition to their assertion that districts did not meet
the compactness requirement, Plaintiffs also brought a partisan vote dilution
claim.216 Dismissing this argument, the court referenced the uncertainty surrounding political gerrymandering claims evidenced by the decisions in both
Vieth and LULAC.217 The court stated, “In light of the Supreme Court’s inability to state a clear standard . . . this Court is unable to find that Plaintiffs
have shown an entitlement to relief at this time.”218 The court’s dismissal of
this claim in Pearson I demonstrates the lack of federal protections against
gerrymandering in Missouri.219 As a result, state limitations on legislative
discretion are rendered even more necessary.
Due to a lack of federal protection against gerrymandering, Missouri’s
compactness provision provides an important second line of defense.220 As
districts drawn for partisan purposes often tend to take on irregular shapes, a
compactness requirement is a natural check on the power of the General Assembly to consider political motives in its redistricting efforts.221 Both Pear-

of racial gerrymandering are justiciable, but are rare and seldom encountered. Id. at
286.
212. Id. at 281.
213. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 413-14.
214. Laughlin Mcdonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially
Manageable Standard and Other Reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 46
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 243 (2009). In a more recent decision, the Northern District
of Illinois described the effect that Vieth and its successors have had on adjudication
of gerrymandering claims, aptly stating that the decisions “place district courts in the
untenable position of evaluating [these] claims without any definitive standards.”
Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:11-cv-04884, 2011 WL 5025251, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011).
215. See Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35, 41-42 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
216. Id. at 41.
217. Id. at 41-42.
218. Id. at 42.
219. See id.
220. See Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
221. See Kemper, supra note 52, at 323 n.8. The importance of compactness in
preventing gerrymandering is perhaps underscored by the origin of the word. It “derives from ‘the fancied resemblance to a salamander . . . of the irregularly shaped
outline of an election district in northeastern (Massachusetts) that had been formed for
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son II and the Missouri precedent on which it was based consistently extol the
virtues of the compactness requirement and proclaim its importance in preventing gerrymandering.222 The stance taken by Pearson II can be traced
back to the court in Barrett, which stated that the purpose of Missouri’s compactness provision was “to guard, as far as practicable, under the system of
representation adopted, against a legislative evil, commonly known as the
‘gerrymander,’ and to require the Legislature to form districts, not only of
contiguous, but of compact or closely united, territory.”223 However, the
scope of legislative discretion allowed to the General Assembly by the court
in Pearson II both compromises the provision and undermines its purpose.

B. The Weakening Effect of Pearson II
In holding that the districts in question satisfied Missouri’s constitutional compactness requirement,224 the Pearson II court interpreted the requirement so loosely as to neutralize the purposes for which it was added, a decision that may subsequently render the state more susceptible to partisan gerrymandering. In its 1912 opinion, the Barrett court spoke to the subjective
mindset of the framers in adopting the compactness requirement, stating:
[It] was not [their] intention . . . to confer upon the Legislature the unlimited power and discretion to form the districts in such shapes and
dimensions as it might, in its own opinion, deem proper . . . . Had the
framers of the Constitution intended that the Legislature should apportion the state into districts according to its own free and untrammeled
225
will, then they would not have used the words of restriction . . . .

The court’s recent decision in Pearson II, however, demonstrates the erosion
that a century of redistricting litigation has wreaked on the framers’ intent.
In deeming constitutional those districts with highly questionable compactness, the Pearson II court has significantly weakened the strength of the
compactness requirement.
In Pearson II, the court observed that recognized factors may justify
“minimal and practical” deviations from compactness.226 Deviations are
hardly “minimal,” however, when both the court and counsel for the state

partisan purposes in 1812 during (Elbridge) Gerry’s governorship.’” Id. (quoting
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969)).
222. See Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 74, 84 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); State ex rel.
Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146 S.W. 40, 61 (1912).
223. Barrett, 146 S.W. at 61 (quoting People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 40
N.E. 307, 315 (Ill. 1895)).
224. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
225. Id. at 54.
226. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 48-49 (emphasis added).
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concede that the districts at issue were noncompact.227 Indeed, in Pearson I,
the court acknowledged Plaintiffs’ statement that districts 3 and 5 were “particularly suspect,” stating that this “can be confirmed by any rational and
objective consideration of their boundaries.”228 The record provides an even
stronger indictment of the “compactness” of these two districts. Referring to
district 5, counsel for the state declared at trial, “[F]rankly, I’m not going to
stand here and defend the compactness of District 5. [It] seems to me to be
problematic.”229 In fact, district 5 – described by the dissent as “L-shaped” –
has a width “so narrow that it almost breaks the district’s congruity.”230
When describing district 3 the state stated, “What you have in District 3 is . . .
something that’s fairly compact.”231 Despite admitting departures from compactness, the court found these two districts, along with district 6, to be constitutional under the “as compact . . . as may be” standard.232
Judge Price, in his dissenting opinion in Pearson II, took issue with the
majority declaring districts to be compact which, in his view, were
so noncompact as to be “visually jarring.”233 He noted that the districts
split communities in half, tore apart cities, and divided counties.234 Judge
Price further stated, “Abstract discussion of law cannot mask the obvious fact
that the legislature has attempted to gerrymander . . . [Article III,
section 45] should be enforced, not finessed in deference to an obvious
legislative shenanigan.”235
In upholding a Map comprised of districts drawn with such questionable
compactness, the court in Pearson II thus demonstrates an interpretation of
the compactness requirement that runs directly contrary to the intent of the
framers of the provision.236 The General Assembly was given such a wide
berth of discretion in its redistricting efforts that decidedly noncompact districts were able to slip through the cracks. In order to combat this concerning
trend, upon a finding of noncompactness to the degree of those districts in
Pearson II, the General Assembly must be required to justify these deviations
in some manner if the districts are to be upheld. By sapping the compactness
provision of much of its strength, the court has created a risk that, without the
addition of a standard of accountability, legislative discretion will continue to
go largely unchecked.

See Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
Id.
Id. at 40 n.2.
Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 72 (Price, J., dissenting).
Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 40 n.2.
Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 53-56.
Id. at 78 (Price, J., dissenting).
Id. (Price, J., dissenting).
Id. at 84 (Price, J., dissenting).
See State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146 S.W. 40, 61 (1912) (quoting People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 40 N.E. 307, 315 (Ill. 1895)).
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
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C. The Necessity of a Good Faith Standard
If the Missouri judiciary is going to allow such a wide berth in state redistricting, it needs to ensure that there is a framework in place to hold the
General Assembly, or redistricting commissions, accountable for gross deviations from compactness. Federal courts incorporate such a system: once a
plaintiff has established population differences (here, noncompactness) that
did not result from a good faith effort to achieve equality, the burden shifts to
the defendant to justify the deviation.237 The U.S. Supreme Court in Karcher
v. Daggett describes this burden-shifting model:
First, the court must consider whether the population differences
among districts could have been reduced or eliminated altogether by a
good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population. Parties challenging apportionment legislation must bear the burden of proof on
this issue . . . . If . . . the plaintiffs can establish that the population
differences were not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve equality, the State must bear the burden of proving that each significant variance between districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate
238
goal.

While Missouri courts have never adopted such a good faith burden-shifting
framework, the Supreme Court of Missouri has previously implied that
good faith is relevant to matters of redistricting.239 In Kirkpatrick, the court
stated, “[T]he Commission made an honest and good faith effort to construct
senatorial districts as compact as may be.”240 While not expressly adopting
the federal standard, the court appeared to be leaning towards an interpretation of the compactness provision that would impose more accountability
on the redistricting authority by requiring the defendant to justify deviations
from compactness.
This momentum was brought to an abrupt halt in Pearson I. In that
case, the Supreme Court of Missouri abrogated the good faith portion of the
Kirkpatrick decision.241 The court reaffirmed this overruling in Pearson II.242
It was a mistake by the court in Pearson II to dismiss the language used in
237. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730-31 (1983); see generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (holding that equal protection requires the
State to “make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts . . . as nearly of
equal population as is practicable”); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533 (1969)
(finding that Missouri did not “satisfactorily justif[y] the population variances among
the districts”).
238. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730-31.
239. See Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35, 39-40 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
242. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 45-46 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
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Kirkpatrick without first considering its merits. In blindly adhering to precedent and declaring the subjective mindset of the legislature “irrelevant” under
the Missouri Constitution,243 the court failed to acknowledge that it was fully
within its discretion to interpret the compactness requirement in a way that
incorporates a burden-shifting standard. In his dissenting opinion in Kirkpatrick, Judge Finch proposed such a standard. He stated:
Appellants have offered no evidence to justify the lack of compactness
in any of these districts, nor to demonstrate any reason why the commission could not have complied with the requirements . . . . In my
view, that burden rested on them when, as here, lack of compactness
244
in fact exists.

Had this opinion controlled, a good faith burden-shifting standard would have
been introduced into Missouri courts.
Furthermore, Missouri would not have been the only state to adopt such
a standard. Courts in both Iowa and New Jersey have interpreted their state
compactness provisions to require burden shifting, even though neither state’s
constitution mandates such a framework.245 The Iowa Supreme Court has
stated that “[t]he goal of any apportioning authority must be to provide for
equality of population and territorial compactness as nearly as practicable.”246
When claims are brought challenging the compactness of districts, the Iowa
Supreme Court has interpreted the state constitution to require the legislature
to show why it could not comply with the standard.247 Likewise, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has held that, when faced with a deviation from the
standard set forth in constitutional redistricting provisions, the state bears the
burden of justifying it.248 Maryland also shifts the burden in cases of redistricting, utilizing a framework similar to that employed by federal courts.249
Citing federal precedent, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that if, after
a hearing, sufficient evidence is presented to “preclude a finding that [a map
is] valid as a matter of law,” the burden shifts to the state to show that districts are compact.250
243. Id. at 46.
244. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d at 436 (Finch, J., dissenting).
245. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 46-47, 47 n.6; see In re Legislative Districting of

Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784, 791 (Iowa 1972); Jackman v. Bodine, 262 A.2d
389, 395 (N.J. 1970).
246. In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d at 791.
247. Id.
248. Jackman, 262 A.2d at 395. These constitutional provisions include a compactness requirement. Id. at 394.
249. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 47, 47 n.7; see In re Legislative Districting of
State, 805 A.2d 292, 306 (Md. 2002).
250. In re Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d at 306 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court of Appeals of Maryland is the state’s highest court.
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While there is no state constitutional or statutory authority imposing
a good faith standard on Missouri courts, judicial precedent in other states
suggests that it would not be outside the court’s authority to adopt this
system. If the court would apply such a good faith, burden-shifting framework, it could strengthen the standard it weakened in Pearson II and in doing
so advance the ultimate goal of Missouri’s compactness requirement: to ensure that every person’s vote is granted equal weight.251 In Pearson I, the
court stated that “the duty to draw the district lines of a contiguous territory as
compact . . . as may be is one that is mandatory and objective, not subjective.”252 However, by not imposing any accountability on the General Assembly, the Supreme Court of Missouri is allowing its subjective whims to
remain perilously unchecked.

VI. CONCLUSION
Pearson II is the last in a line of Missouri cases that have steadily loosened the compactness requirement and, in repeatedly denying a good faith
standard, continuously refused to hold the redistricting body accountable for
its decisions. Rendering this trend even more distressing is the lack of federal
redress for claims of gerrymandering. Missouri’s compactness provision was
intended to provide a second line of defense; yet the state’s judiciary has instead lent its muscle to the legislature, strengthening its discretion while
weakening the objective constraints on such exercises of power. In order to
protect against political vote dilution, it is critical that Article III, section 45
be interpreted in a way that requires the General Assembly to justify its deviations from compactness.

251. See Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992)).
252. Id. at 40.
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